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ABSTRACT 
While in the academic debate the idea of a European public sphere is seen from both 
consensual and conflictual perspectives, in the field of European Union (EU) 
policymaking it tends to assume the profile of a neutral and all-inclusive social space. 
By focusing on the street-level, this article suggests that such view is problematic 
because it fails to resonate with people’s everyday experiences. The article contrasts 
EU policy on civil society engagement and immigration with examples of civil 
society reactions to immigration in two corners of Europe – on the Italian island of 
Lampedusa and in the city of Athens, Greece. In order for the concept of a European 
public sphere to garner meaning outside the EU policy process, it needs to be 
anchored in the everyday politics of social space in Europe. This means embracing an 
‘ethnographic approach’ that is sensitive to difference, diversity and conflict, and to 
the daily (micro)political struggles that are played out in the public sphere. 
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Introduction 
 
The past decade has documented the European Union (EU) becoming increasingly 
attentive to issues that concern the social space it hosts, but this attention has been of 
a very particular kind. In policy terms this translates into a preference for an 
organizational view of civil society and social space, with primary attention on 
political parties, think tanks, media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In 
academic terms this has translated to an interest in constructing an idea of a European 
public sphere around the communicative spaces and practices that link the national 
and European levels (Eriksen, 2005; Koopmans & Statham, 2010). What largely links 
the two endeavours is an emphasis on common denominators and a search for similar 
frames of reference, discourses and behaviours across Europe that will make the idea 
of Europe and European Union meaningful. This article argues that such an approach 
leaves us short-changed in terms of making the European public sphere concept a 
meaningful device for thinking about the lived experiences of social space on the 
ground. 
This recent interest in the development of a European public sphere stands in 
stark contrast with the fact that for decades the idea was conspicuous by its complete 
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absence in the debates and policymaking processes surrounding the European project. 
It was the nature of the early European cooperation that made this both unavoidable 
and tremendously useful (de Beus, 2010). Broadly speaking, the post-Second World 
War reconstruction of Europe had great faith in the planned modernization processes 
that came with the Marshall Plan and the ability of the political elite to keep the 
course towards political stability and economic prosperity (Dedman, 1996). This was 
combined with a remarkably low public interest in the European project, as Europeans 
‘busied themselves with the life of getting and spending’ as Alan Milward notes 
(2004, p. 462).  
In fact, democratic decision-making in the EU has often played catch-up with 
decisions that have already been taken and implemented by the bureaucratic machine 
(Bellamy & Castiglione, 2000). Since Europe’s first supranational community – the 
European Coal and Steel Community – was formally established by the Treaty of 
Rome in 1951, European integration became increasingly reliant on the ‘Community 
method’ (or the ‘Monnet method’). It was a strategy of incremental integration 
through the everyday policy processes and administrative decisions made by the 
political and bureaucratic elite. Consequently the process of European integration has 
not required a democratic consensus to propel itself forward; rather, the incremental 
bureaucratization of the process has generated its own momentum through, for 
example, the growing number of committees (Joerge & Everson, 2000). This has also 
meant that where the idea of European public sphere has gained traction in recent 
policy discussions, it has adhered to the existing processes that are depoliticized and 
technical. This, the article argues, has significant consequences for how the European 
public sphere is understood in the EU policymaking context as a neutral, all-inclusive 
space. 
 However, as the public sphere debate clearly illustrates, the way the European 
public sphere can be conceptualized contains both consensual and conflictual 
trajectories (Della Porta, 2003, p. 5). For example, the extent to which formal civil 
society organizations in Europe can be regarded as a homogenous group is often 
questioned (Meyer, 2009; Dressler & Terrazzoni, 2011). Indeed, the diversity of 
opinions within the public sphere, or a plurality of publics, is often deemed valuable 
because this can challenge existing hegemonies and test the legitimacy of power 
(Eriksen, 2005; Lacroix, 2009). However, such investigations remain rather narrowly 
focused on a particular segment of actors within civil society that already participates 
in national public spheres or the emergent European public sphere. 
The focus of this article is rather on those experiences that take place closer to 
the ground, in the nooks and crannies of social space and among civil society actors 
that are often absent from the debates and discussions that take place in the public 
sphere. This becomes highly pertinent in the context of the current disillusionment 
with European integration. Should we explain this despondency towards Europe in 
terms of an underdeveloped European public sphere, or is it more prudent to look at 
the way the European Union has chosen to operationalize this concept and 
disconnected it from individual experiences of Europe? The historical absence of any 
interest in fostering citizen participation in EU politics has also meant that the recent 
interest in the development of a European public sphere relies heavily on concepts of 
public sphere and civil society as they are used at the national level. The article 
therefore introduces the notion of European social space as an alternative means of 
conceptualizing the European public sphere as a more nuanced and pluralist space.  
By comparing EU policymaking on civil society and immigration with two 
short case studies from the Italian island of Lampedusa Island and the city of Athens 
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in Greece, the article demonstrates the disconnect that exists between policy 
frameworks and lived experiences of immigration and civil society. In other words, 
the way in which differences and conflicts present themselves through these street-
level examples allows us to problematize the EU approach that chooses to focus on 
the neutral and consensual side of social space. In so doing, the article argues in 
favour of a more pluralist and agonistic understanding of what is meant by a European 
public sphere. 
The remainder of this article consists of three substantive sections. The first 
section makes the case for reconceptualizing the approach to the European public 
sphere harboured within the EU institutions and discusses the range of academic 
literature dealing with the idea of a European public sphere, thus positioning the 
formalistic and technical understanding of the European public sphere supported by 
the EU as only one of many approaches found in this field of research. The second 
section illustrates the dominance of public sphere-inspired policy interventions 
through examples from EU policy on civil society engagement and immigration. The 
third section then contrasts the EU policy approach with experiences of immigration 
on the Italian island of Lampedusa and in Athens, Greece. 
A European Public Sphere? 
 
As Slavko Splichal has insightfully observed, it is not easy to agree on what it is that 
we take to be the European public sphere. Because each conceptualization relies on 
distinct empirical evidence, the shape and size of the European public sphere 
inevitably differs between the models (Splichal, 2012). Nevertheless, the common 
denominator for much of the public sphere debate today comes from Jürgen 
Habermas’ seminal opus Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere). His observations are founded on the quantity of 
public participation and the quality of the public discourse therein. Habermas drew on 
the experience of the seventeenth and eighteenth century bourgeois public sphere 
where participation was determined by the merits of the argument rather than the 
social position of the individual (Habermas, 1992, pp. 27-8; Calhoun, 1992). Whilst 
this tended to limit the participants to well-educated males with sufficient wealth to 
possess the luxury of time, the fact that all rational-critical arguments were welcomed 
purely on their merits opened the door for a multiplicity of actors to participate. 
Though the process through which public opinions emerge in the first place can be 
spontaneous and organic, the process of communicating ideas to the wider world that 
follows is more procedural, requiring more formal actors and channels of 
communication. 
The criticisms of the Habermasian public sphere tend to focus on its 
incompatibility with the needs of a modern, pluralistic society. These criticisms, as 
Hohendahl (1992) has pointed out, may be sourced less from the communicative 
interpretation of the public sphere than from a more general disagreement with the 
uncritical application of European liberal values in understanding social practices. A 
pluralist point of view highlights the importance of thinking about public space as an 
agonistic space, prone to competition and struggle between different voices 
(Benhabib, 1992). Seen this way, the communicative approach to understanding the 
public sphere tends to define a public as the public, rather than considering the full 
range of competing counterpublics that occupy the wider social space (Fraser, 1992). 
Although the communicative perspective does not necessarily preclude the existence 
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of counterpublics, by and large the way in which the concept is utilized in the field of 
EU policymaking aspires for a sense of commonness. In the very least, the conceptual 
terrain tends to be rather limited in its consideration for such alternative 
representations of the public sphere. 
These limits to how the European public sphere is conceptualized arise from 
an existing preference for highly procedural and technical policy interventions. Given 
that the post-Second World War existence of civil society and public sphere has been 
limited to the national domain, the conception of a European public sphere has 
naturally taken the national experience as its starting point. But is this necessary? 
Should our perception of what the European public sphere ought to look like be 
unnecessarily dominated by the path taken by national public spheres in Europe since 
the 1950s?  
The problem with this approach, as this article argues, is its exclusive nature. 
If we think of the public sphere as the communicative space where a range of voices 
from civil society engage in a public debate on social issues, we need to consider the 
rules of inclusion in this sphere. Participation is largely limited to formal and well-
established civil society organizations able to engage in the policymaking process 
while interests organized informally or located outside of the mainstream political 
agenda are less likely to be represented, making public debate an unnecessarily 
sanitized affair. While at the national level there exist ways to circumvent the 
exclusivity of the public sphere – such as fringe political parties and local grassroots 
campaigns – it is much more difficult to address this issue at the European level. The 
notion of European social space attempts to reconceptualize the debate about the 
European public sphere in a more rugged fashion and offer an alternative 
understanding of the space available for communicating and engaging with European 
citizenry. 
The European public sphere is likely to face a similar tension between the 
European public sphere and the counterpublics that are excluded, which raises the 
important question of how diversity and conflict are properly accommodated. The 
remainder of this section presents four perspectives on European public sphere 
research, which is done for two reasons: first, to offer three perspectives on the 
'mainstream' debate on European public sphere and how diversity and conflict are 
taken into consideration, and secondly, in the form of a fourth perspective, to discuss 
the added-value of introducing a street-level experience of social space into these 
debates. 
 
A Structural Approach 
 
First of all, the formal realm of institutions and organizations that inhabit this space is 
a common focus in European public sphere research, aimed at understanding the 
relationship between the national and transnational publics. For example, Koopmans 
and Statham identify three processes through which the European public sphere can 
take shape in the sense of transcending the national space without bypassing the 
European space: a supranational European public sphere that consists largely of 
European institutions and EU-related themes; vertical Europeanization of public 
spheres where communicative links develop between the national and EU level; and 
horizontal Europeanization of public spheres that focuses on the communicative 
linkages between European countries (Koopmans & Erbe, 2004; Koopmans & 
Statham, 2010).  
 5 
 
Eriksen offers another three-fold conceptualization of European public sphere 
by referring, in the first instance, to overarching general publics that refer to 
‘communicative spaces of civil society’ such as ‘European audio-visual spaces’ of 
television (Euronews) and print media. Second, transnational segmented publics are 
formed by policy networks that are populated by actors with common interests in 
particular matters. Third, strong publics are made up of legal frameworks, institutions 
and discourses that are engaged in political decision-making such as the European 
Parliament (Eriksen, 2005). 
The above contributions represent an impressive effort to give order to what is 
recognized as a fragmented, differentiated and contested space. However, as useful as 
these conceptual frameworks are in terms of thinking about the range of spaces and 
the variety of ways in which European public sphere can exist, they tend to focus on a 
rather limited set of relations that exist between political parties, think-tanks, media 
outlets, NGOs and other actors that are very much part of the formal, organizational 
character of social space. Focus on such a fixed range of organizational forms means 
that links with actual lived experiences of social space and how people across Europe 
come to experience this space or to engage with it are more tenuous. 
A pluralist perspective would suggest that we need to look at a more diverse 
range of identities, interests and needs of subordinated social groups (Fraser, 1992). In 
other words, we need to be more attuned to the notion of multiple public spheres or 
counterpublics, where voices in the public sphere oppose or exclude each other and in 
so doing struggle against the idea of an overarching unitary sphere (Schildt & 
Siegfried, 2005). 
 
Communicative Approach 
 
Second, the communicative character of the public sphere is an important focus of 
research. A discursive framework is a more flexible way of thinking about 
connectivity within the public sphere and has potential to be an inclusive and open 
method for engaging in debate on European matters. Newspapers and other media 
play a key role in the analysis of the communicative character of the public sphere 
(Bee & Bozzini, 2010; Koopmans & Statham, 2010; Meyer & Moors, 2006; 
Triandafyllidou, Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2009; Trenz, 2004). Some indeed take the 
view that media is the fulcrum of the European public sphere, seeing it as a ‘proxy for 
the (non)existence of a European public sphere’ (Risse, 2003, p. 1). Risse goes on to 
present three communication-based counterfactual tests for the presence of a 
European public sphere: if the same themes are discussed at the same time across 
national public spheres; if similar frames of references and meaning structures are 
used; and if a ‘transnational community of communication’ develops where 
participants acknowledge each other as legitimate voices (Risse, 2003). Mass media is 
what makes EU policies visible to the public and the medium through which 
policymakers receive feedback. Indeed, it is often the only connection between the 
distant EU institutions and the public and therefore an important route for civil society 
organizations to participate in the public sphere and thus give rise to the emergence of 
nuanced versions of the public (Koopmans & Erbe, 2004; Meyer & Moors, 2006). 
The focus on the role of media suggests a more fluid notion of a European 
public space that is less concerned with normative ideas about what it ought to be. 
Rather, its existence is connected to particular issues that transcend the national 
boundaries and give rise to a ‘pan-European discourse’ where it is possible for 
citizens of different countries to participate in a discussion on the same topics at the 
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same time (Eriksen, 2005, p. 258). Whilst this position by no means precludes a 
contested and pluralist space, the communicative approach is still somewhat 
constrained by its focus on the media. It helps us understand certain means through 
which issues migrate from the European arena to the national, and how frames of 
reference and meaning structures of transnational origin are ‘naturalized’ in local 
contexts and vice versa. Yet it is less able to say something about the lived 
experiences that underlie the development of new debates and contested concepts. 
 
Democratic Legitimacy Approach 
 
Concerns over the European project, namely questions of democratic (de)legitimacy 
of the European Union, are another important entry point to the discussion on the 
European public sphere (Giorgi, von Homeyer & Parsons, 2006; Peters, et al., 2005; 
Risse, 2003, 2010; Wessler, 2008; Koopmans & Statham, 2010; Eriksen, 2005; 
Bärenreuter, et al., 2009; de Beus, 2010). The European Union lacks a common, 
recognizable core structure – either social or political – that EU citizens would readily 
identify with in a similar way that they identify with a nation state. The aloofness of 
the EU bureaucracy in turn leads to an emotive disconnect with the European project 
in the sense that there does not exist a unifying sense of ‘Europeanness’. The 
argument connecting the dots between a public sphere deficit and a democratic deficit 
contends that there is, in the first instance, an organic link between the democracy 
deficit and a subsequent legitimacy deficit (Giorgi, von Homeyer & Parsons, 2006; 
Bellamy & Castiglione, 2000). It follows that if we are looking for a treatment for the 
EU’s ailments, any remedy would need to go beyond institutional solutions and 
address an underlying disconnection between the EU and its citizenry (de Beus, 
2010).  
The European public sphere is injected in this debate as a remedial formula for 
overcoming the legitimacy crisis. Europe lacks a political ‘interface’ that connects the 
citizens with the politicians and political institutions (Risse, 2003). For many 
researchers, the intellectual curiosity lies in the fact that the EU provides a unique 
test-case for the existence of post-national democracy and in its slipstream, for post-
national public sphere (Eriksen, 2005; Wessler, 2008; Eriksen & Fossum, 2000). 
Since at the national level this role is fulfilled by means located within the public 
sphere, a simple extrapolation makes it the obvious candidate for democratic 
legitimation beyond the nation state. 
However, as Chantal Mouffe (2000) makes clear, the very idea that the 
rational public sphere could be non-exclusive and non-coercive is problematic. In 
describing what she terms as ‘democratic paradox’, Mouffe argues that if we are 
going to remain truthful to the notion of pluralism, then we also need to be much 
more aware of the politics of difference and the implications this has on what we take 
democratic consensus to mean. In practice, this means that we need to re-introduce 
antagonism, violence, power and repression into our democratic model which is 
something the procedural approach to the public sphere fails to deal with. 
 
 
Accounting for Lived Experiences – An Ethnographic Approach 
 
Mouffe’s argument is a particularly useful entry point to thinking about role of lived 
experiences and everyday politics of social space in the public sphere debate. In the 
closely related field of civil society studies, many are critical of the ‘deodorization’ of 
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the concept (White, 1994) where the political edge of civil society is eroded by the 
instrumental use of the concept as a tool of policymaking (Bebbington, Hickey, & 
Mitlin, 2008; Howell & Pearce, 2001). In the same spirit, in order to challenge such 
flattening and overly consensual usage of the term, others have argued that civil 
society space should be seen as a site of ‘struggle, multivocality and paradox’ 
(Glasius, Lewis, & Seckinelgin, 2004). If we are to explore these dynamics more 
closely we need to look beneath the shiny veneer of formal civil society organizations 
and engage with the unvarnished surfaces of everyday politics.  
This very same point is relevant for public sphere research. The evidence 
suggests that there is hardly any expectation of European policies producing 
homogeneity in the near future (Foret, 2010). Nilufer Göle (2006), for example, points 
out how the inclusion of new social groups requires an understanding of how the 
limits of the public sphere are being constantly renegotiated through everyday 
politics.1 This process, she insightfully observes, is likely to be political and 
confrontational because it deals with mutual change, rather than integration. An 
ethnographic approach allows us to enter the field of everyday politics and understand 
how the plurality of experiences generates differences that lead to confrontation and 
conflict. 
EU Policy and Social Space 
 
The EU, through policy that deals with issues such as governance, civil society, 
participation and immigration, positions itself in a particular way in these debates 
regarding the European public sphere. The aspirations behind EU policy can tell us 
about the normative positions that inform the policymakers, and the processes 
contained in these policies in turn tell us who, in their view, inhabits the European 
public sphere and what are the best mechanisms to engage them. The policy 
documents indicate that despite the existence of highly nuanced research on the 
subject where public sphere is understood also as a source of differences and as a 
space for conflict, the EU perceives the concept almost purely as a mechanism for 
reaching compromises and generating commonalities.  
EU perceptions on the question of public sphere are set out in a 2006 
publication, White Paper on European Communications Policy, which sets out the 
aim of developing a European public sphere. The document justifies this endeavour in 
terms of the challenge presented by the current ‘communications gap’ between the EU 
and its citizens and suggests that the development of a European space for debate and 
dialogue would help to close this gap. The document opines that European citizens,  
apart from electing the members of the European Parliament, have limited 
opportunities to exercise their voice on European matters, not least because ‘there is 
no obvious forum within which they can discuss the issues together’ (European 
Commission, 2006, p. 5). All political debates viewed important by the public take 
place at the national level, engendering a sense of alienation from Brussels despite the 
fact that many important policy decisions are in fact taken at the EU level. The 
solutions proposed by the document are structured around themes such as: ‘defining 
common principles’, ‘working with the media and new technologies’, ‘understanding 
European public opinion’ and ‘doing the job together’ (ibid.). The themes alone 
suggest that there ought to be an agreed set of objectives and a shared toolbox that 
stretch across the member states. The more specific policy proposals focus on efforts 
at civic education that inform citizens about public policy and the establishment of 
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forums that will breathe life into the debate around these policy issues. In other words, 
this suggests that once citizens are more aware and informed they are more likely to 
agree on common principles and working together towards common goals, through 
the language, discourses and frames of meaning established by the EU. These policy 
aims indicate that the concept of a European public sphere within EU policy 
deliberations is seen as a decontested and inclusive space for all EU citizens to 
participate in. 
Similar attitudes are reflected in other EU policy documents that relate to 
discussions of European public space and civil society. The White Paper on European 
Governance suggests that the European public lacks confidence in the EU because it 
is complex and poorly understood (European Commission, 2001a). The document 
also conveys the belief that greater public participation is an intrinsically good 
outcome; that greater involvement of civil society is naturally democratizing by 
because it gives people a voice, or at least amplifies it. A working paper that helped to 
inform the White Paper on European Governance, called Consultation and 
Participation of Civil Society, suggests that public involvement could be facilitated by 
formulating an accreditation system for European NGOs that wish to participate in 
consultations and by developing a comprehensive database for all NGOs available for 
consultation when relevant issues arose (European Commission, 2001c). A second 
working paper entitled Broadening and Enriching the Public Debate on European 
Matters points in particular to the linguistic barriers that exist in the way of a 
European political culture and identifies the need for a ‘common narrative when 
discussing the history, development and objectives of the European Union’ (European 
Commission, 2001b, p. 3). Indeed, taken together these policy documents suggest that 
EU policymakers largely stick to the consensual, rather than the conflictual trajectory 
of public sphere research, and in so doing ignore the rough edges and fractures that 
can be found beneath the smooth surface of civil society. In this sense the policy 
examples above seem to lack traction with the diversity of experiences that 
characterize civil society, because the documents present a rather instrumental view of 
how individuals engage in policy processes. Given that such a view is likely to gloss 
over any agonistic relations within street-level politics that determine the means of 
inclusion and exclusion in these processes (Bebbington, Hickey & Mitlin, 2008), one 
is compelled to ask how much traction such policies really have.  
 
EU Integration and Immigration Policy 
 
The perception that the European public sphere is a space largely devoid of conflict is 
also communicated through EU immigration policy. The suggested policy 
interventions propose to address immigration questions through technical solutions 
that focus on methods of controlling immigration and on tools that help with both 
economic and social integration. While the overall aims are largely unproblematic, 
these policy interventions seem to assume a non-exclusive public sphere where a 
neutral consensus is possible. 
In a document entitled A Common Agenda for Integration, the Commission’s 
aims are clearly framed around an ambition for a ‘common, comprehensive, 
consistent and coherent’ policy (European Commission, 2005). The document 
suggests that through education focused on what are regarded as ‘European values’, 
such as human rights and tolerance, as well as through an increased interaction 
between third-country nationals and EU citizens, it is possible to achieve greater 
integration. What we find here is an expectation that the uptake of European values 
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will naturally follow from an education program and, secondly, an assumption that 
interaction, by virtue of being interactive, will help integration regardless of its 
content.  
In order to further operationalize the integration agenda, the Commission has 
since published a communication entitled A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: 
Principles, Actions and Tools that sets out ten action points constructed around three 
common principles: ‘prosperity, solidarity, and security’ (European Commission, 
2008). Immigration is approached from the positive perspective of economic 
prosperity, where it is pointed out that immigration can make a great contribution to 
the European economy as long as the skills of those entering Europe are matched with 
existing needs. This positive potential, however, is realized through successful 
integration that emphasises the ‘practical intercultural skills for effective adaptation as 
well as the commitment to fundamental European values’ (European Commission, 
2008, p. 7). The second principle, ‘solidarity’, refers to border management at the EU 
periphery and to the nature of integration policies. Given the EU’s open internal 
borders, the only way to manage immigration effectively is by working together and 
this justifies an EU-wide immigration policy that includes all member states. The 
third principle of ‘security’ aims to reduce the number of illegal immigrants entering 
Europe through measures such as improved border controls, biometrics, and tighter 
visa regulation. The protective and preventative policies captured under the security 
principles are viewed as enabling, because these policies effectively limit the arrival 
of immigrants in the EU to those that live up to the expectations of the first two 
principles. 
More recently the European Commission has resolved to implement what it 
calls the ‘tracking method’ that will lead to a centrally collected set of migration data 
from all member countries that enables annual comparisons as well as suggestions for 
improvements in how legal immigration is organized – by identifying the priorities, 
needs and reception capacities of each member state. Described as a ‘stepping stone 
towards a comprehensive EU migration policy’, the document outlines a method for 
organizing legal immigration, controlling illegal immigration and making border 
controls more effective (European Commission, 2009, p. 2). All in all, in its pursuit of 
a common immigration policy the EU has taken a route that favours technical 
solutions that focus on coordination and cohesion of the rules of entry to the EU 
rather than on the experience of immigration in the recipient EU member states.  
Whereas the academic research on the public sphere is quite attentive to the 
range of different views represented in this space, as well as to the potential conflicts 
that arise from this, the approach adopted by the EU lacks this nuance. The policy 
interventions are designed for a technical context where non-exclusive and non-
coercive social relations prevail. For this reason EU policy is in real danger of 
remaining disconnected from the broader European public, because the policy 
interventions do not relate to local experiences of social space. This disconnect is 
elaborated further in the next section. 
 
 
The Challenge 
 
Since the legitimacy deficit that the EU faces is an important motivation for the public 
sphere-inspired debates, it is important to explore the characteristics of this deficit in 
more detail. One way to capture some of the most relevant elements of this 
multifarious phenomenon is to think about it in terms of Euroscepticism. Although 
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widely studied, the interpretations of the term have tended to gravitate towards the 
role of political parties and political systems (Conti & Memoli, 2011; Taggart, 1998; 
Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008). However, as the rest of this 
article suggests, it is also possible to identify counterpublics that exist at a much more 
local level, where the groups’ sense of Euroscepticism is based on personal 
experiences of immigration, for example. 
Éric Fassin and Judith Surkis (2010) have argued that the EU is being made 
redundant in the national level debates on immigration in two important ways. The 
first is the direction of the broader narrative on immigration among the far-right 
groups in Europe. Over the past two decades we have witnessed a shift in the way 
third-country nationals have been framed as immigrants, for they are no longer 
excluded on the bases of binary or essentialist claims. Rather the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion are defined by establishing a certain package of citizenship 
rights as the liberal values that ought to be universally accepted (Joppke, 2008), which 
is problematic (Dressler & Terrazzoni, 2011). At the extreme end of this scale we find 
aggressive, hard-line integration, along the lines of ‘Schmittian liberalism’ that rejects 
the idea of negotiation and compromise found in the multicultural variants of the 
liberal value-based attitudes. Schmitt (1996) argues that only by identifying clear 
boundaries between friends and enemies can a polity become aware of its 
distinctiveness where the perception of a threat heightens citizens’ sense of their own 
identity. Whatever we think of the tone of this argument, it rightly draws our attention 
to the politics of these societal relationships.  
The second way has to do with the manner in which liberal European values 
become appropriated as a rationale for exclusion and intolerance.  The definition of 
insiders and outsiders is shifting away from a national to a post-national frame of 
reference. The objection to immigration no longer arises as a national reaction that is 
based on origins or biological descent, as this is not necessarily the first port of call in 
identity construction. Instead the EU, and the type of Europe this represents, becomes 
one side of the binary categorization, posed against non-European migrants. In the 
case of Muslim immigration for example, instead of asking ‘whether Muslims can be 
good Germans, Italians, or Danes … they question whether Muslims can be good 
Europeans’ (Fassin & Surkis, 2010, p. 499). Ironically, while this is exactly the kind 
of value-based integration that the EU has been advocating, here it transmogrifies into 
a criterion for exclusion (Antonsich, 2008) and serves as an example of how local 
politics generate fragmentation and exclusion rather than compromises and inclusion. 
 
Immigration at Europe’s Perimeter: Lampedusa Island and Athens 
 
The experiences of immigration offer an illuminating case study of the discordant 
everyday political encounters between the newcomers and their European hosts. 
These experiences tell us something about the way immigrants, by merely inhabiting 
the social space of their host country, foster conflictual and discordant responses. 
Their mere presence spawns a range of political reactions from the local public who 
are prompted to react to this (Göle, 2006). The two cases in question are Afghani 
immigrants in Athens and Tunisian immigrants on the Italian island of Lampedusa, 
both being sites located at the frontline of the EU’s struggle against illegal 
immigration (Frontex, 2012). 
 These two cases have been chosen because they exemplify the difficulty of 
operationalizing the EU policy objectives on the ground (Bryman, 2008). They are 
examples of local experiences that illustrate the kinds of confrontations that can 
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surface around questions of immigration and as such demonstrate the fragmentation 
and discord surrounding debates in the public sphere. Until the beginning of 2011 
Athens had been the main entry point for illegal immigrants looking to enter the EU. 
In the aftermath of the conflicts across North Africa, the main flow of immigrants has 
since then shifted to Lampedusa. The cases can therefore be regarded as a forming a 
‘critical case study' (Yin, 2003) that focuses on two salient but atypical events in order 
to see how such circumstances might fit within the current policy approaches. The 
data from which these accounts are constructed consist of newspaper, media and 
agency reports from an array of different sources, both local and international.2 Whilst 
this is not an exhaustive treatment of the subject, these accounts open a door to 
thinking about how the lived experiences on the ground may not only highlight 
aspects of the EU public sphere research but also reflect on the appropriateness of the 
EU policy approach.  
The local and the European reactions to the events unfolding in Lampedusa 
have been particularly illuminating of the way immigration debates take place on the 
ground. The press reports create an image of an island overflowing with North 
African immigrants, with as many as a thousand arriving on one day and over 22,000 
in the first three months of 2011. This has led to extreme overcrowding in the island’s 
only detention centre, leaving most of the entrants to live in makeshift outdoor camps, 
contrasted with the usual sleepy existence of the of the island’s 5000 permanent 
residents, whose daily lives have been completely overturned by the North African 
arrivals (Reuters Africa, 2011). The fragile local economy that relies on fishing and 
tourism for income has ground to a halt. Residents interviewed on TV programmes 
express concern over hygiene at the detention centre and the camps.3 These anxieties 
turn into angry protests where fishermen attempt to block the entrance to the harbour 
while another group of locals complain of the inhumane treatment of the Tunisian 
migrants (Al Jazeera, 2011). In all cases the target is the Italian government and its 
perceived inability to deal with the situation.  
 The media coverage, through its imagery and language, conveys a strong 
sense of emergency. The island is ‘full’ or ‘overflowing’, and reports are illustrated 
by pictures of rickety boats arriving at the Lampedusa harbour already occupied by 
hundreds of earlier arrivals. The reports often focus on the tension between the 
desperation of Tunisian migrants looking for a better life and the hopes they place on 
Europe as an answer to their woes. Virtually all of these reports focus on the figures 
that at least implicitly draw an image of a Europe being invaded: 5000 local 
inhabitants contrasts starkly with 1000 new daily arrivals, although in a Europe of 400 
million this represents but a drop in the ocean (in the 1990s Germany received 
250,000 Bosnians fleeing violence in their homeland) (Thomson & Bechir, 2011). 
Despite this broader context, the media successfully describes the situation as one 
where Europe’s outer perimeter has been breached, where the EU is facing an 
immigration emergency, of either a legal or a humanitarian kind. These sentiments are 
then transposed to the national political agenda.  
Perhaps the most striking aspect of these debates is the absence of an EU 
voice. The national positions have dominated the discussion while the European 
Commission has initiated meetings but without issuing an official statement that 
would lay out the Commission’s position. This highlights the difficult position the EU 
faces in making itself heard in some of the critical discussions that are defining 
Europe. As immigration-related concerns remain highly politicized they resonate 
significantly more in their national political environments.  
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The second case, that of Afghan immigration to Athens, has developed more 
gradually over the past ten years where the presence of Afghan immigrants has 
developed into a particularly thorny and emotive issue due to the way these 
immigrants have come to occupy Athenian public space. Since at least 2007, entire 
public squares have been inhabited by families who have made these outside spaces 
their homes – hundreds of Afghan immigrants are living in one square alone. These 
spaces are located in areas with high immigrant populations, the squares surrounded 
by overcrowded apartment blocks, together generating an image of a city full to the 
brim and overflowing onto the streets and into the squares and parks of Athens (Al 
Jazeera, 2010). 
More recently the response by local residents and right-wing activists has 
grown more aggressive. Over the past two years local vigilante groups have been 
formed that gather at the squares and parks with the intention of ejecting the 
immigrants from these spaces. Members of the militant neo-Nazi group Golden Dawn 
have supported these ‘indignant’ local residents. Together they have been able to 
mount an offensive against the immigrants, physically – and often violently – clearing 
out squares and patrolling them in order to make sure no one can return. In addition 
they have organized public demonstrations in protest of the growing number of 
immigrants arriving in Athens and Greece, where Golden Dawn members have 
marched in a military formation, each individual carrying a Greek flag (Athens-
Macedonian News Agency, 2010).  
The negative reactions against the Afghan immigrants in particular have 
particularly Greek undertones that relate to the way public space is delineated along 
religious lines. There is not a single mosque in Athens, despite over 120,000 Muslims 
living in the city. The debate on building a mosque dates back to the run up to the 
2004 Athens Olympics when a mosque was required in order to offer adequate 
facilities for Muslim athletes to carry out religious ceremonies. The mosque, planned 
to be constructed in the district of Peania 20 miles outside of Athens city centre, was 
never built, following protests by local residents and strong objections by Peania’s 
mayor (Tzilivakis, 2002). The spokesperson of the Greek Orthodox Archbishop made 
the following statement at the time: 
 
The church respects every individual’s particular religious beliefs, and 
because Islam is a well-known religion, it does not object to the creation 
of a mosque under certain conditions – namely that the mosque is not 
built in the centre of Athens because the average Greek cannot yet 
accept the idea of a minaret in the city centre (Tzilivakis, 2002). 
 
The response by the Muslim community in Athens to these restrictions in the 
shape of public space has been, by way of protest, to conduct their Eid prayers openly 
in the public parks. There have also been more aggressive demonstrations where the 
Muslim community has been joined by left-wing groups and anarchist groups to claim 
back the squares they had been driven away from. The purpose of these public 
protests is to also express frustration over the difficulties immigrants face in receiving 
the appropriate documentation they believe they are entitled to as political asylum 
seekers, framing their case explicitly in the language of human rights and ‘European’ 
values. These events culminated over two days in January 2011 when hundreds of 
illegal immigrants took over the Law School at the University of Athens (Athens-
Macedonian News Agency, 2011). University campuses in Greece enjoy immunity 
meaning that police cannot enter the grounds without receiving an invitation to do so. 
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This was a highly effective form of protest that brought the immigrants’ claims to the 
epicentre of the public eye while out of the authorities’ reach. The more radical 
members of this group continued the protest with a hunger strike. 
In such street-level contexts, it is impossible not to question the resonance of 
EU integration policy. The everyday experiences and understanding of migration by 
both immigrants and locals are far removed from the rational and technical policy 
proposals set forth by the EU, underlining the widely different sociocultural context 
from which national experiences of immigration rise.  
Conclusion 
 
The above examples stand in stark contrast to the efforts by the EU apparatus to 
devise EU-wide policy initiatives that resonate with the everyday lives of EU citizens. 
Whether we look at the policy on immigration or the development of a European 
public sphere, the EU plans stick too close to the consensual trajectory, inflating its 
policy with assumptions about the non-exclusive nature of its policies that are 
incongruous with reality. This approach relies largely on a selective reading of the 
existing public sphere research, choosing to focus on the procedural mechanisms – 
such as communications – through which democratic legitimacy can arguably be 
addressed. Not only does this approach instrumentalize the European public sphere to 
deliver particular policy goals, it also ignores the wide array of relationships that take 
place in the public sphere as well as those excluded from it.  
As the examples from Athens and Italy show, the public sphere is shared 
across a diverse range of actors, often with very different views on given subjects that 
lead to conflictual and antagonistic relationships. Moreover, the outcomes of these 
struggles are often coercive and exclusionary. It is therefore important to be more 
attentive to the conflicts and to begin our analysis of a European public sphere from 
the characteristics of the social space that give rise to it. An ethnographic approach 
that is sensitive to the everyday politics that get played out in this space is critical for 
such an analysis, as it would take as our starting point a plural, diverse and conflictual 
notion of European social space. If the EU is serious about addressing its legitimacy 
deficit by reconnecting with its citizens, it is almost certain that this needs to begin 
from a more serious consideration of locally relevant experiences of Europe. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1
 These issues are also explored in a research project under the Seventh Framework Programme entitled 
EUROPUBLICISLAM, which is applying a largely ethnographic methodology that proposes to study 
‘the assemblages that bring together cultural differences in proximity and in confrontation across 
national public spheres, following a transnational dynamics’. For more information see 
http://cordis.europa.eu/search/index.cfm?fuseaction=proj.documentandPJ_RCN=10331471    
2
 These include Athens News, Al Jazeera, Euronews, France24, RAI, Reuters, reports from the UN 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR), as well as blog entries and video documentaries from reporters and citizen 
journalists.  
3
 See for example ‘Lampedusa Tensions – New Migrants Land on Island’ report from Al Jazeera 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyyPa9HTE-sandNR=1 and ‘Italy’s Lampedusa left in crisis after 
Arab Spring’ report from the BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13747558  
